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Abstract 
 
This article is a part of a twin study. Drawing on the available evidence, in this paper the 
author examines the cost of compliance with Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
for poor countries with reference to Africa. He shows that the burden of cost of 
compliance is entirely on the exporters despite the fact that their capacity for the 
compliance is limited. He further indicate that that, in fact, the literature often disregards 
the cost of loss of exports, or rejection of products at the border of an importing country, 
let alone the cost of reorganization of the supply chain; the existing organization of 
supply chain in poor countries would result in the lack of export expansion. The purpose 
of the paper is not to have an exhaustive literature survey, but to draw on the scanty 
evidence related to the main argument of the study. More specifically, it is shown that the 
main characteristics of the SPS Agreement and the related measures applied by main 
importing countries are such that they require a complex, difficult and high cost “SPS” 
system. Such a system involves regulatory measures, policy re-orientation, and 
development of the necessary infrastructure, re-organization of the supply chain, 
enhanced capacity building and a forward looking strategy, particularly for exports. The 
preparation for the compliance is also difficult for the poor countries as it is knowledge 
intensive, requires a learning period, training and a close cooperation between the public 
and private sector in various stages of the supply chain. Yet the socio-economic cost of 
the lack of compliance is enormous. Generally speaking, the operational cost, alone, of 
compliance is estimated to be between 2 to 11 percent of value of export in the case of 
Africa; in each case it depends, however, on the type of product, the destination of 
exports, the capacity of the country for the compliance and the size of farm holdings and 
exporting enterprises and the organization of the supply chain. Further, the investment 
cost can be colossal; in some cases (e.g Mozambique) exceeding the total food exports of 
the country. The available studies provide estimates for the administrative cost of control, 
inspection, testing and certification at the border; but disregard more important costs such 
as the costs of delays in exportation or rejection at the port of importing countries. Thus 
they downplay the need for taking preventive measures and the related cost of 
reorganization of the supply chain. In a separate paper the author proposes alternative 
organization of the supply chain for reducing the cost of compliance while increasing its 
benefits (Shafaeddin, 2007). 
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     Introduction 
Developed countries resist reducing Trade Distorting Subsidies (TDS)-the so-called Blue 
Box subsidies- on agricultural goods and tariffs on their imports. Further, even when they 
do agree to some reduction in their tariffs and TDS, they try to compensate it by 
increasing the Green Box subsidies1. These subsidies are not regarded as trade distorting 
measures under WTO rules. Nevertheless, they do in fact distort trade, reduce their 
imports of agricultural products and affect their international prices to the detriment of 
developing countries2. Nevertheless, this is not the only way exports of agricultural 
products from developing countries are affected. They, also introduce trade restrictive 
measures through mounting Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, on these 
products3
 Scanty evidence is available in the literature on some costs of compliance with 
SPS measures. Most often, however, the cost resulting from the delay in exports, or the 
rejection of the product at the port of the importing country, due to the lack of 
compliance are disregarded-let alone the most important costs related to the need for the 
reorganization of the supply chain. Nonetheless, it will be argued in this paper that for 
poor countries, the compliance with SPS measures is not only difficult but it is also 
highly costly, in relation to their export earnings, and per capita income level; even when 
judged on the basis of the underestimated cost. It will be also shown .that as their 
capacity for the compliance is limited, such difficulties and cost would result in slow 
export expansion in the absence of the compliance. The policy proposals for coping with 
the compliance with cumbersome SPS measures are considered in a separate paper where 
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we discuss, how to reduce costs of compliance while increasing its benefits in the 
particular case of least developed countries.  
 In the first section, we will argue that the main characteristics of the SPS 
Agreement and the related measures applied by developed countries are such that they 
incurs high cost on the exporting developing countries, as the burden of proof is on the 
exporters and the lack of compliance would result in restriction of their exports to those 
destinations. In the second section the need for a complex SPS system will be 
highlighted. In the third sections we will discuss the nature and the diversity of the 
measures needed for effective compliance and provide some rough estimates of the costs 
of various activities required for the compliance with SPS measures for a number of 
products. The impact of the SPS measures on exports of agricultural products to main 
developed country market will be the subject of the last section before concluding the 
paper.  
 
I. Main characteristics of the SPS Agreement 
The main characteristics of the SPS Agreement are such that , to be able to benefit from 
its implementation requires a complex, difficult and high cost “SPS” system involving 
regulatory measures, policy orientation and enhanced physical and knowledge capacity 
for implementation.  
 
i. Complexity and wide coverage 
The stated objective of the SPS Agreement is to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health by taking “any” sanitary or phytosanitary measures necessary (Para 2 of Article 2 
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of the SPS Agreement). Accordingly, the requirements and guidelines of SPS measures 
are diverse and complex entailing three sets of international standards provided by the so-
called “three sister organizations” These organizations include, Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the Office of 
International des Epizooties(OIE).They provide technical regulations for a vast number 
of activities in the supply chain of exports of agricultural products from input to 
production and harvesting, storage, transport, processing, packing and labelling, port 
facilities and international transport. The implementation of the SPS Agreement requires 
various scientific, technical and legal skills and capacities. For example, in the case of 
plants alone, they include about 50 different activities and measures ranging from 
adaptation of rules, regulations, guidelines, standards of the country in conformity with 
SPS Agreement and international standards, pest management and surviance, 
establishment of pest free areas, inspection, certification, accreditation, development of 
laboratory facilities etc. The requirements for food products and animal health are also 
similarly diverse and complicated. 
 In addition to standards set by “three sister organizations”, governments of 
importing countries often have their own standards comprising a set of large number of 
regulations. For example, EU has 24 Regulations and directives (CTA, 2003:1). Further, 
there is a growing number of commercial (private) standards set by retailers in importing 
countries (see e.g. Henson, 20064 and various sources in Food Policy, Vol, 30, No.3, 
2005) e.g. EurepGAP, Tesco and British Retail Consortium (BRC). These standards are 
not only often more stringent than the official Government standards, but they are less 
transparent than the official SPS measures as they are not reported to WTO. Private firms 
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have incentive to set their own standards (Hatanaka et al., 2005:356)5 not only to 
differentiate their products and create,or improve, reputation (Fulponi, 2006), but also to 
be able to choose the form of standards, as against public standards, to minimize their 
own costs (McCluskey, 2006). As the retail food sales market in developed countries 
becomes more concentrated and the “quality-centered competition” becomes more 
important the role of private standards in food imports increases (Henson and Readon, 
2005; 242 and Jaffee & Masakure, 2005). For example, in the case of Europe, in 2003, , 
the five-firm concentration ratio for retail food sales varied between about 18 in the case 
of Italy to over 60 in the case of Portugal and Finland and nearly 80  in the case of the 
UK (Henson (2006,7). Private retailers purchase about a quarter of fresh fruits and 
vegetables sold in developing countries.(OECD, 2006). The role of large retailers in sales 
of foods is also increasing in some developing countries. For example, Carrefour 
accounts for 25 % of all food retail sales in Argentina ((Henson and Readon, 2005; 247). 
UNCTAD correctly distinguishes between government [and WTO] regulations aiming at 
“outcomes”[finished products] and private sector standards focussing on the “process” 
[of production and exports of a product in the supply chain]( UNCTAD; 2007; 3). 
 Another factor which adds to the complication of implementation of the 
Agreement is a tendency towards the lack of harmonization of the standards and 
regulations. Different countries implement different SPS measures. For example, out of 
154 notifications on tropical fruits and vegetables by EU, Japan, USA and Canada during 
1995-2004, 59 per cent were non-harmonized, and another 19 per cent were only partially 
harmonized (Pay, E.2005: 44, table 14). Even within EU sometimes the measures applied 
to a product, for example to fruits and vegetables, may differ from one country to another 
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(World Bank, 2005:22, 24 and 29). While Codex has set up over 2500 maximum residual 
levels (MRLs) for pesticides, the EU, the USA and Japan have over 22000, 8600 and 
9000 MRLs, respectively (Dong and Jensen:5). The new harmonized 1998 EU standards 
for Maximum level of Aflatoxin B1 is 2 pbp (part per billion)6 as compare with 9 pbp for 
Codex International Standard (Lacovone, 2004:35, table 4). Moreover, some private-
sector standards, e.g. EurepGAP require compliance with the regulations of both 
exporting and importing countries involving food safety, occupational health and safety 
and even non-food safety related issues such as some social conditions. The burden of all 
costs is, however, imposed on the exporting countries. One implication of the diversion 
from Codex for the exporting countries is that while according to WTO’s SPS 
Agreement, the acceptance of Codex standard will be sufficient for imported products, 
the country has to observe a more restricted standard for its exports imposed by the 
importing countries, involving higher cost of compliance (see below).  
 
ii. Speed of change 
The rapid change in SPS measures, regulations and notifications of new regulation is 
another factor which causes not only difficulties in preparation for the compliance, but it 
also imposes extra costs on exporters and creates uncertainty for them as well as for 
investors. In the case of break up of a disease importing countries may also give 
“emergency notices”. The total number of notifications of new SPS measures to the WTO 
increased from about 100 in 1995 to over 4600 in 2005 (Henson, 2006, 10). During 1995-
2004, in the case of fruits and vegetables, it increased more sharply from 29 to 888, by 
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over 30 times; for the tropical fruits and vegetables, exported mostly by developing 
countries, increases from 2 to 197 during the same period. (Pay, 2005: P 12, table 12).  
 
iii. Importance of reputation and the risks of disguised trade protection  
Reputation in the observation and compliance with the regulations and standards is 
extremely important. If the importers discover deficiencies in a product originating from 
a specific country in their random inspection, they may put ban on imports of that product 
from that country. While the SPS measures are meant to protect health and life of human, 
animals and plant, the experience shows that the discovery of a case of deficiency in 
compliance may be used as an excuse for banning imports from a country.  Therefore, an 
exporting country should be endowed with technical, scientific and legal knowledge and 
information to be able to defend itself in a possible dispute case in WTO. One example is 
the ban imposed by Saudi Arabia in 1998, and more recently by Egypt, on imports of live 
animals from some East African countries7.   
 
iv. Need for learning and the importance of time  
Preparation for the implementation of SPS measures is knowledge intensive, it involves a 
learning process requiring time and training. Similarly the capacity building from “farm-
to-fork” also requires a long period of time as there is a need not only for a control 
system throughout the supply chain but also for a change in the method of organization of 
production and distribution in the supply chain, including the choice and the use of inputs 
such as fertilizers and pesticides.  
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The domination of small and scattered holdings, particularly in large poor 
countries, the low degree of literacy, particularly in the rural area, the lack of means of 
information dissemination and poor infrastructure, transport system, processing and 
packing facilities are among features of poor agricultural exporting countries.  For these 
reasons the capacity building for compliance with SPS for the entire agricultural area 
would be a very long and expensive process even if the necessary resources were 
available.  
 
v. The involvement of the private sector and the difficulties of coordination 
In the supply chain, and in the control system, apart from the government, a number of 
actors in the private sector are involved, ranging from importers, farmers, dealers, traders, 
industrialists, exporters, owners of means of transport, etc. In the public sectors, the 
implementation of SPS measures touches a number of government organizations, 
including the ministries which deal with trade, industry, agriculture and rural 
development, health and transport as well as the custom authorities, the food and drug 
administration and control, and standard organization etc. Therefore, the need for a close 
coordination among various agencies in the public sector as well as between the public 
authorities and the private sector increases the complexity and difficulties of compliance 
with SPS measures. 
 
II. The need for a complex SPS system and a forward-looking strategy 
The characteristics of the SPS Agreement outlined above, therefore, requires a SPS 
system with a forward looking strategy, proactive policies and preventive measures rather 
 9
than defensive actions by an exporting country. Such a system necessitate an efficient 
compliance policy, adaptation of rules and regulations, a mechanism and set-up for 
coordination among the stakeholders, and an effective capacity for implementation and 
compliance. It therefore, entails various requirements throughout the supply chain 
including knowledge, information, information dissemination and awareness raising, 
technical, legal, institutional and managerial training, as well as physical capacity and 
infrastructure for control, inspection, testing and certification. Chart I shows a framework 
for the general requirements of the compliance to the SPS Agreement and various stages 
of the supply chain, from farm to the port of exportation, for which actions are necessary. 
The left hand side of the chart show the facilities and requirements for the compliance, 
while the right hand side of the chart indicates the targets for compliance in the supply 
chain. It is clear that the system is complex for a least developed country with limited 
financial resources, government bureaucratic capacity and particularly with scattered 
small holdings and fragmented supply chain.  
     Insert Chat I here 
The studies so far conducted on the SPS issues have often concentrated on the 
need for the provision of facilities, mainly in the public sector, as means of control at the 
stage of exportation; that is they have been concerned with the “outcome” They have not 
made a clear distinction between the facilities and the targets in the supply chain; they 
have paid little attention to the complexities of applying the SPS measures to the targets 
in downstream activities of an export product before it reaches the port.  In other words, 
while they have discussed what should be done; they have not addressed the practicalities 
and difficulties of the application of their recommendations at various stages of the 
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supply chain in poor countries, particularly at the farm and transport levels. One example 
is the recommendation made by the World Bank (2005) for the implementation of Good 
Agricultural Practices Codes of OECD to poor countries. We have discussed this issue in 
more details in a separate study where we have proposed an effective organization of the 
supply chain. In the rest of this paper we will consider the implication of the complexity 
of the SPS system for the cost of compliance and exports, particularly for least developed 
African countries.  
 
III: The cost of compliance 
The requirements of SPS Agreement 
The costs of compliance with SPS measures are related to both imports and 
exports. Nevertheless, the burden of the cost is mainly on the export side for three main 
reasons. First, the changes necessary for compliance with the standards of the importing 
countries is necessary for export expansion, irrespective of the membership of WTO. In 
other words, if SPS measures required by importing countries are not applied to exports, 
the exporting country would lose its market in those countries whether it is a member of 
WTO or not. The only difference is that after the accession to WTO, the application of 
SPS measures becomes a legal obligation for the contracting parties  
Secondly, by contrast, according to the SPS Agreement, applying standards to 
imports are not obligatory, but if technical regulations are applied to imports they should 
confirm with international standards or related rules of SPS and be applied equally to 
similar domestic products.  
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Thirdly, for the accession to WTO, with few exceptions, requirements for imports 
are the same as that of exports (see Appendix A). The establishment of the National 
Notification Authority (NNA) is required for the accession. It, however, has a double 
function as it not only notifies other countries on changes in the country’s regulations on 
imports, but also receives notifications on changes in the regulations and standards of  
imports of other countries, which have bearings on the country’s exports. Risk 
assessment for developing standards for some import items, requires scientific capacity 
which has to be developed and it is costly. But the country can base its risk assessments 
on those of the international organizations, or borrow them from other countries. 
Establishment of  an enquiry point (EP) is almost a total requirement on import side, but 
the cost is not significant as compared with the cost of preparation for compliance with 
SPS measures for exports.  
The “standstill” clause (item I of the check list in appendix A) is the major source 
of the cost on the import side as it involves changes in the rules and regulations 
governing standards. Nevertheless, the requirement for the implementation of the 
Agreement for export products also necessitates changes in the “law and other 
regulations” of the country on food safety.  
In short, the main burden of the cost results from the need to comply with SPS 
measures for export products. The aim of compliance on the export side is not 
compliance for the sake of compliance, but as a means of improving market access and 
export expansion and development. In the following discussion, however, we do not 
separate the related costs for SPS measures related to exports and imports.  
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A few general points  
The precise socio-economic costs and the impact of the implementation of SPS is 
not easy to measure and studies undertaken so far have not been able to go beyond certain 
rough estimates as a number of hypothetical and unquantifiable factors are involved. 
According to a World Bank study: “while there is general agreement that food safety and 
agricultural health measures do indeed strongly impact international agro-food, there is 
no consensus on the relative importance of individual measures and in relation to other 
trade distorting measures, nor their aggregate net effect”(Jaffee and Henseon (2004:17) 
Nevertheless, the experience of developing countries and the results of studies under 
taken, particularly on least developed and/or other low income countries, lead us to the 
following points.  
• The burden of the cost of compliance is imposed on exporting countries. 
• The cost of compliance is relatively high in relation to the income level of the low 
income and least developed countries and resources available to them. 
• While the cost of compliance is high, the short-and long-run cost of the lack of 
compliance is enormous, in terms of the loss of foreign exchange, income, 
employment and household consumption, particularly in rural area. 
• The cost and the efficiency of the compliance depend, inter alia, on the 
organization of the supply chain.  
Before explaining some of these issues, let us first make a few conceptual 
comments.  
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Definition of the cost of compliance 
The literature on food safety considers the cost of compliance with SPS measures for an 
export product; but it does not often include the cost of necessary change in the 
organization of production for facilitating the compliance, which would eventually also 
lead to the reduced unit cost of compliance. According to the literature, the cost of 
compliance is the sum of all expenses which accrues to the public as well as the private 
sector i.e. farmers and enterprises involved in the supply chain. Accordingly, it includes 
the cost of adjusting (not reorganizing) various components of the supply chain in order 
to conform to the SPS Agreement and SPS measures imposed by importing government 
and enterprises, the administrative cost of control, inspection, testing and certification. 
One could also add the cost of delays in exportation (e.g. interest charges) caused by the 
procedures necessary for the compliance. When the compliance may result in the 
reduction of exports (see the case of EU’s Aflatoxin standard below), the loss of export 
earnings should also be taken into account. If exports are reduced, there will be secondary 
costs in terms of the loss of income at the country, farm and firm levels, as well as the 
loss of employment and household consumption. 
The World Bank correctly distinguishes between fixed and operational costs 
(World Bank, 2005:71-2). For example, for testing a product, there is a need for initial 
investment in equipment, training of laboratory personnel and testing officers as well as 
the cost of accreditation. The operational cost will include maintenance, salaries, and the 
cost of laboratory materials. One should add to the variable costs (operational costs), the 
cost of participation in “three sister international organizations”  
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The compliance with SPS measures may also involve some opportunity cost. For 
example, the opportunity cost of investment in large farms to facilitate Good Agricultural 
Practices (GAP) may be at the cost of reducing extension services for small holdings 
which may result in a fall in their production and income. 
The cost of compliance with the SPS measure acts like an export tax as far as its 
impact on export prices is concerned. The difference between the two, however, is that 
unlike the case of export tax which creates revenues for the government, the cost of 
compliance is born by the county, the burden of which is shared between the Government 
and the private sector. To individual producers and the firms involved, it is similar to 
transaction costs. For small exporting countries, it will not be necessarily possible to pass 
on the cost of compliance to importers. 
When unjustified SPS measures are imposed by the imports they will act as  
“disguised quantitative trade barrier” and will result in the loss of export involving costs 
for the producers and exporters. Develop countries, in fact, do impose such measures. For 
example in the meeting of 27-28 June 2007 of the SPS Committee of the WTO, 
developing countries complained that not only different developed countries impose 
different MRLs (maximum residue level) of pesticides on theie imports, but often they 
impose a level higher than that of Codex Alimentarius without scientific justification 
(WTO, 2007). It was said, for example, that “out of 345 principal pesticide substance 
registered in the country[Argentina], only 32% have maximum residue levels agreed in 
Codex.”. Further, over one-third (37 out of 98) of SPS notifications received by WTO in 
May 2007 have been about new or revised pesticide requirement (South-North 
Development Monitor, 2 July 2007: 1-2) Often the new MRLs notified are not backed by 
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scientific justification (WTO; op. cit.). In particular, the MRLs set by some private 
standards are not only high and scientifically unjustified, but also are not transparent as 
they are not notified to WTO as mentioned before. To defend unjustified trade restriction, 
an exporting country has to take defensive measures for dispute settlement which also 
requires the necessary scientific, technical and legal capacity involving further costs.  
If the cost of compliance increases import prices in the importing countries, it will 
have negative impact on demand. On the other hand, effective compliance with SPS 
measures, could also contribute positively not only to market access but also to product 
prices in the final market. This is so because such products will be regarded as 
differentiated ones for which the consumers may be prepared to pay premium prices. 
Whether the fruit of increased prices is reaped by the exporters, would depend on the 
distribution of benefits of differentiation of the product between exporting countries and 
retailers. 
The overall impact on prices is not, however, clear. What is clear is that the cost 
of compliance is high for poor countries as will be explained shortly, but the cost of the 
lack of compliance will be even higher as it could result in restrictions, or prohibition, of 
import of a non-complying country in the destination thus acting as a quantitative 
barriers. In other words, the cost of compliance is far less than the cost of loss of export 
earnings due to the lack of compliance.  
 
The variation in the cost of compliance 
The information on the cost of compliance is scanty particularly that it comprise many 
elements related to various activities in the supply chain (see chart I). Further, the costs of 
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loss of income due to delays in exports, or rejection of the product at the port of imports, 
and reorganization of the supply chain are not often included. Nevertheless, even then the 
available incomprehensive evidence suggests that it is high, in relation to exports, 
particularly for small holdings in low income countries. According to the ACP 
Secretariat, the operational costs of the compliance with SPS alone “represent overhead 
of between 2 per cent and 10 per cent of value of products exported by the vast majority 
of ACP countries. (CTA, 2003:3). Further, the Secretariat concludes that the impact of 
SPS Agreement on market access of many ACP countries, particularly in Africa, has 
been negative and the fisheries sector of the region has suffered more than other sectors. 
However, no quantitative measure of social loss is provided beyond arguing that the 
higher is the share of agriculture in GDP and employment [and exports], the higher will 
be the cost due to the loss of exports (CTA.2003:60 and 26-28). Similarly a study on 
India indicates that the potential losses to India “from strictness of the standards set and 
from the variation in the standards among the seven export destinations” [main developed 
countries] are high (Jayasuriya et. al (2006). For example, the demand elasticities for four 
food product exports of India varied from -0.58 in the case of Japan to -2.78 in the case of 
the Netherland (ibid, 6). 
The wide range in the estimated figure of cost by ACP indicates that no general rule 
can be drawn for the cost of compliance. It depends, inter alia, on the type of products 
exported, the destination of exports, the size of farms and the capacity of the country for 
compliance and the organization of the supply chain. To begin with, when a country is 
exporter of sensitive products, it is often more subject to the risk of rejection by 
importing countries. At the global level, the following products, ranked in order of the 
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proportion of trade affected, have been the most important products impacted by border 
rejection based on technical standards during 2000-01: 
• Fish and fishery products,  
• Meat and diary products 
• “Other processed products” 
•  Fruits and vegetables and their products and nuts and spices,  
• Animal feed and grain, tropical beverages,  
• Oil seeds, textiles fibbers, drinks, tobacco/cigarettes and sugar and 
confectionery8 
The destination of exports affects the cost of compliance as importing countries have 
different standards as mentioned earlier. Developed countries, particularly, EU, impose 
the most stringent SPS measures on imports. For example, the negative impact of the 
difference between the 1998 harmonized EU standard for maximum level of Aflatoxin 
and that of the Codex international standard, accepted by some other countries, on 
African exports of cereals, fruits, vegetables and nuts estimated to be  US$670 million 
(Lacovne, 2004:31). Further, the cost of compliance is imposed not only on the 
governments, but also on the private operators involved in production and exports. For 
example, the EU’s new Regulation which came into effect in January 2006 requires the 
implementation of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) for control of 
hygiene and the adherence to Codex rules throughout the supply chain by the exporters 
because it is assumed that the private operators have the primary responsibility for food 
hygiene. The principles of HACCP include: analysis of hazards; identification of critical 
control points; establishment of preventing measures; establishment of monitoring 
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procedures; establishment of corrective actions; establishment of procedures to verify that 
the system is working properly and, the establishment of record keeping documenting 
system. These requirements necessitate investment by the private operator in the 
exporting countries as EU requires pre-approval of all establishments involved in 
production and exports.  
The capacity to comply, of course, depends on the level of development of a country. 
The lower the level of development, the lower is the necessary capacity. Often more 
sensitive products, e.g. fish, are also the most “demand dynamic” products in 
international trade (see Shafaeddin, 2007). Thus the lack of necessary capacity for the 
compliance would cost them slow export growth. The organization of the supply chain 
and the size of farm holdings and firms involved in exportation also affect the unit cost of 
compliance; the more fragmented the supply chain and the smaller the size of farms and 
exporting enterprises, the higher is the unit cost of compliance (see also below).  
 
Estimates of costs of compliance for various products 
For the reasons explained above, the precise estimation of the overall cost of compliance 
is not possible for each country and each product, particularly the costs related to 
downstream activities before a product reaches the port. The ACP Secretariat provides 
rough estimates of the cost compliance for various functions related to the control of a 
product at the end of the supply chain.  There are also some scattered estimates for 
various individual products at the country levels. Table 1 provides estimates of costs of 
various activities necessary for compliance of an African country with SPS measures at 
2003 prices. This estimate, however, excludes the operational costs. Further, it is 
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assumed that certain activities (mostly training facilities) will be provided at the regional 
level rather than at the level of individual countries. Moreover, it does not include costs 
of modifications of downstream activities and it is not clear whether or not the estimate 
includes the requirements for compliance with the private sector Codes of Practices. Yet 
more, it does not include such costs as certification and accreditations.  
Insert tables 1 and 2 here 
At the country level, some rough partial estimates of costs are available for 
Ethiopia and for a few products for a couple of African and other countries. Table 2 
provides some estimate for establishing quality and certification for Ethiopia. The 
estimate, however, does not include the private costs as well as the operational costs for 
the public sector. Further, it does not include certain important cost such as the cost of 
accreditation of all laboratories and certification authorities let alone the cost of 
adaptation of the supply chain for the compliance. Even then the estimated figure 
accounts for over 1.9 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 3.1 per cent of value of total exports, 
exports of agricultural goods and food products of the country in 2003, respectively.  
Certification and laboratories for various chemicals and hygiene require 
accreditation. The initial (assessment) cost of a typical accreditation for each certification 
body is nearly US$ 40,000. When the cost of setting-up the system, and costs of 
implementation, inter-laboratory testing and writing -up documents are added, the total 
cost easily reaches nearly $180,000 for each accreditation9. As there is a need for 
accreditation of a number of laboratories and certification bodies, the cost of 
accreditations will be very high. The recurrent audit and certification costs in the case of 
private standards for mangoes vary between 1% of sale in the case of Chile, 4% in the 
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case of South Africa, and about 1% to 2.5% in the case of Ghana and 4% to 15% in the 
case of Peru (depending on the volume of sale) (OECD,2006,10-11).  
In some cases EurepGAP provides group certification which reduces recurrent 
unit cost. By contrast, when a products is exported to different markets requiring different 
certificates the cost of certification increases further. The cost of record- keeping, use of 
tracking system from field to exporters and other managerial tasks is another substantial 
operational cost; in the case of mangoes was between $ 800-1000 per month (OECD, 
Ibid, 12). The cost of audit and certification, like other costs, has to be bone by suppliers 
entirely with the exception of Fairtrade Labelling Organization (Hatanak et. al.(2005:357 
and 361)10. 
 Table 3 shows the cost of compliance for the tropical fruits for a couple of 
African countries. Such costs are enormous in relation to the related export items of the 
countries concerned. Data on exports of their tropical fruits is not readily available. 
However, the figure are very large in relation to total exports of food of Mozambique 
($126m) and Guinea (about $8m) in 2002 for which data is available (Based on 
UNACTAD, Handbook, Ibid: table4.1A). The initial investment is over 7 per cent of 
export earnings in 2002 in the case of Mozambique, and it exceeds the total food exports 
in the case of Guinea for the same year. As the operational cost for the public sector is 
not estimated, no judgement can be made in this respect. However, the burden of the cost 
is mainly on the public sector. By contrast, in the case of Indian spice export, the burden 
of the investment cost was mainly on the private sector (World Bank, 2005: 85).  
Insert tables 3 and 4 here 
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The cost of upgrading of the fish plants does not seem to be significant in the case 
of Bangladesh and Nicaragua (table 4). However, in countries where little facilities for 
fish processing exist, the cost could be colossal. For example, the average increase in unit 
production cost for Kenya’s industrial fish processors per plant due to the compliance 
with SPS measures was 25 per cent (World Bank: 2005:83). 
For meat and livestock, we do not have an estimate as various investment and 
operational costs are involved in the supply chain of these products. For the estimated 
cost of vaccination see Annex table B.1. 
 When private standards are required, the (private) cost of upgrading the farm adds 
to other costs. For example, to comply with EurepGAP, the investment (private) cost of 
upgrading of a pineapple farms in Ghana was between $25 to$80 per acre. These costs 
included “building for storage of chemicals, changing rooms, toilets and dinning-room or 
upgrading of packing and washing facilities”(OECD; Ibid,11). Generally speaking the 
cost of compliance  with private standards are higher than that of public standards 
because they are more complex and are often reliant on “process” than on 
“performance”(Mainville, et. al. 2005:340). 
An important shortcoming of most estimates of the data on costs so far provided 
is that they are related to the cost of “control” paying little attention to preventive 
measures and the difficulties and costs of adjustment, of the supply chain, particularly at 
the farm level or the reorganization of the supply chain. As mentioned earlier the cost is 
higher when the supply chain is fragmented than where it is vertically integrated. In fact, 
estimation of such costs are neither easy nor very useful as the main problem is the 
difficulties and the time necessary for adjusting the supply chain where farms holdings 
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are small and scattered, farmers are illiterate, extension services are lacking and the 
transport ,processing and packing systems are inadequate and the supply chain is 
fragfmented. There is a need for a different organization of the supply chain for the 
expansion of exports altogether to facilitate the compliance, reduce its cost and enhance 
its benefits (see Shafaeddin, 2007).  
   
The burden of the cost of compliance 
The cost of compliance is extremely high for least developed countries and small 
holdings. In this respect, three important points should be emphasized. First, as far as the 
burden of the cost on the government is concerned one should bear in mind the 
magnitude of the cost of compliance with SPS Agreement together with the cost of all 
other WTO Agreements. According to one estimate, the cost of implementation of 
“…just three  WTO Agreements[Custom Valuation, SPS and Intellectual Property Right] 
of the six Uruguay Round Agreements that involve restructuring of domestic regulations, 
come to about $150 million[in 2000 prices]….. [which] is more than the annual 
development budget for eight of twelve least developed countries for which we could 
find a figure for that part of the budget” (Finger and Schuler, 2000:525).  
Second, the burden of the cost of compliance is unequally distributed between 
developed and developing countries, as it is imposed mainly on the latter11. For imports, 
a developing country should apply standards which meet the requirement of SPS 
Agreement-e.g. international standards. These standards are based on standards which 
had already been developed by developed countries and had been in use in these 
countries, whereas developing countries have to adjust to them. Further, in case 
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developing countries use other standards, they have to demonstrate that they are 
scientifically justified for which, unlike developed countries, often lack the necessary 
capacity. For their export items also developing countries have to develop the capacity to 
comply with the standards imposed by developed countries and bear the cost of testing, 
certifying and accreditation etc. in addition to the cost of adjusting their supply chain.  
 Third, as the income level of developing countries, particularly least developed 
countries, is far smaller than developed countries, their ability to bear the opportunity 
cost of compliance is, relatively speaking, significantly higher than that for the developed 
countries particularly that small holdings are dominant mode of agriculture in these 
countries. 
 
Cost of the lack of compliance 
The lack of compliance involves both short-run and medium to long-run opportunity 
costs. The short-run cost includes the immediate loss in export earning, national income, 
income of farmers, trades and households as well as employment. Further, the lack of 
compliance will have negative impact on education, health and well being of the peasant 
not only because they lose their main source of income, but also because of the negative 
impact on Government revenues thus its provision of social services. To such long-run 
effects one may also add those related to difficulties in regaining credibility and 
reliability even when the sources of the problem are tackled.  
The situation can be exemplified with the case of Rift Valley fever affecting 
livestock in the Somali Region of Ethiopia and the resultant ban by Saudi Arabia on 
imports of livestock from Ethiopia. In 1998, the Government of Saudi Arabia imposed a 
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ban on imports of livestock from Ethiopia which was removed after 16 months. But after 
an outbreak of the disease within Saudi Arabia and some neighbouring countries, a new 
ban on imports from Ethiopia, and other countries in Horn of Africa, was imposed by 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen and UAE. The Saudi’s ban on imports of live animals from 
Ethiopia was still in effect as of mid 2006 although the ban on meat has been lifted and 
there was no evidence of disease in livestock of Ethiopia anymore. 
According to a simulation exercise, it is estimated that exports from the Somalia 
Region of Ethiopia declined by 42 per cent during the first 16 months when the ban was 
in force (Pratt, et.al: 17). Further, the GDP of the Region declined by US$ 91m (25 per 
cent) and the producers experienced the loss of value added of about 50 per cent due to 
the fall in prices of livestock (Ibid:17 and 3and 20). In addition to producers, the traders, 
brokers, transport and retailers experienced declines in their income (Ibid: 23). The only 
gainers were butchers who benefited from the decline in the price of the livestock in the 
domestic market. Household income of pastoral and sedentary farmers (503912 families) 
was also adversely affected by between 19 to 25 per cent. The pastorals in general were 
more severely affected, and the middle income households in both groups were the main 
losers (Ibid: 21 and 52). The consumption by producing households was also affected 
negatively by about 7.5 per cent in nominal terms as a result of the decline in their 
income. 
The longer-term effects of the lack of compliance is that as of today(mid-2006) 
the Saudi Government has not removed the ban on imports of live animals from Ethiopia, 
despite the fact that the disease had disappeared, presumably because of the lack of 
confidence in the product exported from Ethiopia. Even if the ban was not justified on 
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scientific grounds any more, it had been instigated because of the initial lack of 
conformity of the export products to the standard of the importing country, but persisted 
even when the problem was tackled.   
There are a number of other cases of the lack of conformity of a product by an 
exporting country which has cost the country a lot. For example, the experience of China 
after its accession to WTO indicates that SPS barriers to trade in EU, Japan and the USA 
affected about 90 per cent of exporters of foodstuffs and animal by-products and led to 
losses of $9 billion in 2002 (Dong and Jensen,2004:2). The experience of China also 
reveals that the failure to comply with SPS measures will lead to more frequent and 
closer inspections of future export products of a country by the importers (Ibid: 2-4). The 
Scandal on dog and cat feeds, toothpastes etc. imported to the USA from China led to a 
trade tension between the two countries in 2007 and the Chinese admitted that that their 
national credibility, reputation and image was damaged as far as food safety was 
concerned (F.T. July 10 2007). 
The experience of many developing exporting countries also shows that often 
their intervention in the SPS measures has taken place ex-post i.e. after they are alerted 
that their product faced a problem in the port of the importing country as a result of 
inspection by the relevant authorities (World Bank,2005: xviii). The lack of control by 
the exporting country at the port of exporting and more importantly at the farm level, or 
other segments of the supply chain, was the route cause of the problem. The result has 
been trade disruption and in some cases the return of the product to the exporting country 
involving the transport cost and the costs of disposal of the product. (See Ibid: 90). 
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Distributional impacts 
In compliance with SPS measures, small holdings and small exporters will be in a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis large ones because of the fact that they have to bear higher unit 
cost of compliance even if all other constrained were removed.  
Small-holders have problems in meeting standards, particularly private ones, in 
terms of quality, food safety, GAPs and traceability even where infrastructure are suitable 
and public-private cooperation operate satisfactorily-let alone in poor least developed 
countries. Moreover, their unit cost of compliance will be high because of their small 
size. As a result, they will be driven out of market. For example in the case of Chile “it is 
exceptional to find small producers…involved in the fruit market (OECD, 2006,17)12. In 
Kenya, the number of small holder reduced by 60 per cent between 2002 and 2006 
because of their lack of capacity to comply with SPS measures (UNCTAD, 2007)13  As 
there high risks that small holders would be excluded from the export market, . there will 
be a trade off between export expansion and negative distributional impact of compliance 
with SPS requirements. the involvement of large holdings and exporters will help export 
expansion but the fruits of exports may not rich the poorer strata of population in the rural 
area. The distributional impact however is not inevitable (see Shafaeddin, 2007). On the 
other hand, the lack of development of large farming may constrain export expansion at 
least in the short-and medium terms until the general agricultural practices are improved 
throughout a country which will be a tedious, expensive and a very long process in the 
case of least developed and other poor countries.  
The standards imposed by some retailers in the importing country have nothing to 
do with SPS Agreement. Nevertheless, the fact that in practice are made requirements for 
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the purchase of the products from other countries, it involves additional cost for exporters 
often beyond the ability of small firms and farmers. For example, to be able to sell to 
some UK supermarkets, there is a need to obtain BRC certification which requires large 
investment in upgrading pack-house facilities. It is estimated that the amount of 
investment for such upgrading for vegetables would be nearly 11 per cent of an annual 
sale of $.1.4 million (World Bank: 2005: 104). Further, “...to laying down and enforcing 
their safety and quality requirements, the leaders[food retailers in main importing 
country] are increasingly consolidating their systems of procurement, entering into long 
term relationships with a more limited number of ‘preferred suppliers’”(World Bank:, 
Ibid: xiii) ,which naturally would be those who could afford to conform to their 
standards. Least developed countries and small holders in these countries therefore, will 
be the main losers.  
 
IV: The impact of SPS measures on exports of Africa 
The difficulties of complying with SPS measures have resulted in redirection of African 
exports of food products away from the developed countries which are the main markets 
for these products. Table 5 provide data for destinations of exports of foods, agricultural 
raw materials and total exports of African developing countries. Accordingly, it is evident 
that the share of developed countries in total markets for exports of foods of African 
developing countries was stable during 1980s; but it started declining with the coming 
into effect of the SPS Agreement in 1995. Subsequently, it fell sharply, particularly in the 
case of EU which used to be the main market for Africa. Of course, the redirection of the 
market for exports of foods may not have been caused entirely by difficulties in 
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compliance with SPS measures of developed countries. I t can be partly explained by the 
expansion of South-South trade for other reasons. Nevertheless, SPS measures must have 
had a strong influence. This is so because the share of developed countries as a market 
for total exports of African developing countries did not, in fact, show as sharp 
redirection as in the case of foods according to the same table. The comparison of the 
corresponding data for Agricultural raw materials and food products is even more 
revealing; the table indicates that the share of developed countries as a market for exports 
of agricultural raw materials changed little during 1990-95, and remained more or less 
stable between 1995 and 2003, i. e. after the SPS Agreement was signed. The reason is 
that, with exception of hide and skin and linseed oil, other agricultural raw materials14 are 
hardly subject to SPS measures.  
Insert table 5 here 
 The redirection of trade of countries which have not yet acceded to WTO is even 
more supportive of the negative impact of SPS measure on redirection of exports. Table 6 
shows the direction of exports of Ethiopia and Sudan as two examples. Neither country is 
a member of WTO and has little facility for the compliance with SPS measures of 
developed countries. Accordingly, both countries show sharp declines in the share of 
developed countries, particularly EU; as a market for their export15.  In other words, the 
lack of their capacity for compliance with SPS measures has been accompanied with 
what the World Bank calls “exist” policy. An “exist policy” implies trying to redirect 
trade from countries with stringent SPS measures, here developed countries, towards 
“easier” markets. As those countries are large importing countries, such a policy has also 
resulted in slow export growth (Shafaeddin, 2007). An “exist policy” is not a viable 
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policy as easy markets will not remain easy in the future. The poor countries have no 
choice than complying with SPS measures whether they join WTO or not. The question 
is how this can be done to reduce the cost of compliance and enhance its benefit. We 
have provided an answer to this question in a separate paper (Shafaeddin, 2007).  
Insert table 6 here 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the cost of compliance with SPS measures for poor 
countries with reference to Africa. It was shown that the main characteristics of the SPS 
Agreement are such that their implementation requires a complex, difficult and high cost 
“SPS” system involving regulatory measures, policy re-orientation and enhanced capacity 
building. Diverse and complex regulations, standards and guidelines are to be used 
ranging from technical regulations set by the so-called “three sister organizations”, to 
standards applied by government and enterprises of importing countries. Such standards 
are not harmonized and sometimes change rapidly in emergency situations. They cause 
not only difficulties in preparation for the compliance, but they also impose extra costs on 
exporters and create uncertainty for them as well as for investors. Preparation for the 
implementation of SPS measures is knowledge intensive and involves a learning process 
which requires time, training and a close cooperation between the public and private 
sector in various stages of the supply chain for exports.  
The characteristics of the SPS Agreement outlined above, therefore, requires a 
SPS system with a forward looking strategy, proactive policies and preventive measures 
rather than defensive actions by an exporting country. Such a system necessitate an 
efficient compliance policy, adaptation of rules and regulations, a mechanism and set-up 
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for coordination among the stakeholders, and an effective capacity for implementation 
and compliance. Therefore it is highly costly and difficult for poor countries.  
Although the costs of compliance are related to both imports and exports, the burden 
of the cost is on the export side; with few exceptions, requirements for imports are the 
same as that of exports. As far as exports are concerned; the burden of the cost of 
compliance is imposed on the exporting countries; the cost of compliance is relatively 
high in relation to the income level of the least developed and other low income countries 
and resources available to them; while the cost of compliance is high, the short-and long-
run cost of the lack of compliance is enormous, in terms of the loss of foreign exchange, 
income, employment and household consumption, particularly in rural area; the cost and 
the efficiency of the compliance depend, inter alia, on the organization of the supply 
chain.  
The cost of compliance is the sum of all fixed and operational expenses which 
accrue to the public as well as the private sector i.e. farmers and enterprises involved in 
the supply chain. These costs include those necessary for adjusting various components 
of the supply chain, the administrative cost of control, inspection, testing and certification 
and the cost of delays in exportation (e.g. interest charges) caused by the procedures 
necessary for compliance. The cost of compliance is like export tax with the difference 
that in the case of export tax the revenue is collected by the government, but in the case 
of compliance the cost accrues to the public and private sectors.  
Generally speaking the operational cost, alone, of compliance is estimated to be 
between 2 to 11 percent of value of export in the case of Africa. The investment cost is 
also significant exceeding in some cases ( e.g. Mozambique) the total annual food exports 
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of a country However, no general rule can be drawn. The cost depends, inter alia, on the 
type of products exported, the destination of exports, the capacity of the country for 
compliance, the size of farm holdings and the organization, i.e. degree of vertical 
integration, of the supply chain. At the global level, the following products, ranked in 
order of the proportion of trade affected, have been the most important products impacted 
by border rejection based on technical standards during 2000-01: fish and fishery 
products, meat and diary products, “other processed products”, fruits and vegetables and 
their products and nuts and spices, animal feed and grain, tropical beverages, oil seeds, 
textiles fibbers, drinks, tobacco/cigarettes and sugar. EU has the most stringent SPS 
measures where importing enterprises also impose additional standard requirements on 
imports of food products. Small and scattered farm holdings and fragmented supply 
chain, which are dominant characteristics of the food system in poor countries, are 
subject to higher unit cost of compliance than large farm holding and a vertically 
integrated supply chain. 
 It is true that compliance with SPS measures is difficult and highly costly for least 
developed and other poor countries. Nevertheless, in order to expand exports, they have 
little choice than developing their capacity for the compliance irrespective of their 
membership of WTO.  The question is how this can be done to reduce the cost of 
compliance and enhance its benefit. A separate paper is allocated to the discussion of this 
issue (the Shafaeddin, 2007).  
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Table  1: Cost of various initial activities necessary for the compliance with SPS 
Agreement in an African country (2003 prices) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Activity       $(1000) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. To strengthen the institutional framework      56 
2. To update the legal and regulatory framework    76 
3. To upgrade and rationalize inspection services   604 
4. To upgrade the scientific and technical capabilities of labs 1,505 
5. To train quality control managers in the implementation of  
 food quality assurance system including HACCP  120 
Total at country level      2,391 
Additional cost of Regional activities   6245 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: CTA (2003:40-44). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The cost of a programme for establishing quality control and certification system 
for agricultural exports with the objective of enhancing the regulatory and food 
control system of Ethiopia 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Component       Recipients       Cost($US) 
1. Institutional & legislative reform    MOARD,MOH,MTI        838,598 
2. Capacity building in conformity  
assurance for GOE organizations   MOARD, MOH, QSAEa       5,569,248 
3. Regulation of conformity assessment  MOARD,QSAE       2,621,210 
4. Capacity building of Ethiopian certification companies for certification  
  for conformity to Ethiopian standards: QSAE; private sector         211,056 
5. Capacity building for certification in niche  
markets/special schemes              QSAE, MOARD, private sector        197,058 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total                             9,925,507 
Source: JICA project 
a. If designated as enquiry point 
b. Estimated time for execution: 5 years 
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Table 3: Cost of compliance for some African countries for Tropical fruits (US$) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Country    Public    producers and private sector
        Initial   operation 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Tanzania   2,520,500   98690  20500 
Mozambique   9,250,000   109,400 23600 
Guinea    5,936,600   2,197,200 27000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNCTAD (2006: 32-58) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The cost of upgrading for compliance with SPS measures for the fish processing 
in Bangladesh and Nicaragua 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Cost of upgrading  Maintenance 
 Country   (% of base year X)  (% of annual exports)  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bangladesh: 1996-8   2.3    1.1 
 Nicaragua: 1997-2002  0.61    1.26 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Based on World Bank (2005:77) 
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Table 5: Main destination of exports of developing African countries 1980-2003 
(percentage of total ) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   1980  1990  1995  2000  2003 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Country groups     Food  
 
Developed; of which: 74.2  74.1  73.5  62.3  62.3 
Europe   59.4  61.4  58.9  50.4  52.3 
 Eu  (57.1)  (60.4)  (57.5)  (48.7)  (51.4) 
USA   10.3  5.1  4.9  4.4  4.8 
Japan   2.6  5.4  6.9  6.7  3.5 
 
     Agricultural raw materials 
 
Developed; of which: 74.4  57.9  54.4  55.6  54.2  
Europe   61.8  50.1  46.3  42.2  44.7 
  
 EU  (60)  (49.3)  (45.2)  (44)  (43.3) 
 
USA   4.2  2.7  3.1  3.3  3.0 
Japan   6.5  3.3  2.5  5.4  5.9 
 
      Total exports 
 
Developed; of which: 82.9  79.4  74.4  68  69.8 
Europe   48.7  56.8  51.9  50.4  52.3 
 EU  (46.2)  (56.0)  (50)  (48.7)  (51.4) 
USA   31.3  19.0  18.0  4.4  4.8 
Japan   2.1  1.4  1.9  5.7  3.5 
Source: Based on UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, 2000, table 3.2.1.H and 2005, table 
3.1.H 
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Table 6: The direction of exports of Ethiopia and Sudan; percentage in total exports 
(1995-2004) 
 
Ethiopia   Sudan 
Region   ------------------------------------ --------------------------------- 
   1990 1995 2000 2004  1990 1995 2000 2004 
 
EU (16)  41.2 50.9 40 29.6  38.8 30.7 11.6 5.0 
Japan   14.9 12.7 10.5 8.8  6.0 6.5 19.1 13.7 
USA   11.2 6.9 5.9 6.0  2.8 4.0 0.1 0.4 
Africa   12.7 12.6 16.8 19  7.1 3.0 3.4 3.2 
West Asia  10.2 10.1 7.6 10.9  10.5 25.9 10.5 8.1 
Others   9.8 6.8 19.2 25.7  34.8 29.9 55.3 69.6 
Total   100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 
of which: 
Eu+Japan+USA 67.3 70.5 56.4 44.4  47.4 41.2 30.8 19.0a 
All developed   67.4 71.5 59.9 47.5  47.9 42.8 30.8 19.0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Based on UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, Ibid: table3.1A) 
a: Does not add-up because of rounding 
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Appendix A 
 
Checklist of Illustrative SPS Issues for Consideration in Accessions 
Commitments (by the time of accession) WTO Reference 
1. Standstill: the introduction of new 
standards, animal health regulations and 
food safety regulations shall conform to 
SPS Agreement principles. 
1. Generally agreed principle in WTO 
accession negotiations. 
2. Establishment and operation of a single 
Contact Point for Information ("enquiry 
point"). 
2. Article 7 and Annex B.3. 
3. Transparency: notification and access to 
documentation: 
3. Articles 7 and Annex B, Also G/SPS/7. 
 (a) identification of authority 
responsible for making notifications 
to the WTO and ensuring 
transparency obligations are met on 
an ongoing basis; 
 (a) Annex B.5.(b) and Annex B.10. 
 (b) establish guidance or law requiring 
publication of proposed measures at 
an early stage for comment; 
 (b) Annex B.5(a). 
 (c) provision in law or administrative 
procedure to provide copies of 
proposed measures to WTO 
Members; and 
 (c) Annex B.5.(c). 
 (d) require in law or administrative 
procedure, a reasonable period of 
time for comment from Members 
and the public, and establishment of 
a process to take comments into 
account without discrimination. 
 (d) Annex B.5(d). 
4. Necessity: measures are applied only to 
the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant health. 
4. Article 2.2. 
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Commitments (by the time of accession) WTO Reference 
5. Regulations Based on Science: 
regulations governing animal and plant 
health and food safety shall be based on 
scientific evidence. 
5. Articles 2.2, 3.3 and 5.2. 
6. Harmonization: to the extent possible, 
members shall follow international 
standards, guidelines, and 
recommendations in establishing SPS 
measures. 
6. Articles 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4. 
7. Equivalence: members shall recognize 
different measures that achieve the same 
level of protection. 
7. Article 4. 
8. Risk Assessment: developing scientific 
evidence and conducting risk 
assessments to ensure that measures are 
based on science and applied only to the 
extent necessary to protect health. 
8. Article 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. 
9. Regional conditions: measures take into 
account the regional characteristics both 
of the areas from which products 
originate and the areas for which they are 
destined. 
9. Article 6 and Annexes A.6 and A.7. 
10. Non-discrimination:  measures do not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 
between different members or between 
domestic and foreign suppliers. 
10. Article 2.3, and Annex C.1(a) and (d). 
11. Control, inspection and approval 
procedures: ensure that procedures, 
including systems for approval of the use 
of additives or for establishing tolerances 
for contaminants in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs comply with the Agreement. 
11. Article 8 and Annex C. 
Source:WTO: WTO/ACC/8 
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Appendices B 
 
Table B.1 Cost of disease control in a few developing countries (US $) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Per animal    Indemnity for 
   Vaccination  surveillance  culled animals 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Zimbabwe  1.25   0.75 per year    
Argentina  1.50      250 per head 
Philippines  0.50   0.50 
Uruguay  0.75a      200 per head  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
a. Includes $0.10 cost of emergency system per animal 
Source: World Bank (2005:92). 
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     Notes 
                                                 
 
1 “…the Common agricultural Poliy (CAP) of 2003 would shift a large bulk (about 75 per cent) of the Blue 
Box subsidy to Green Box. The latest Five Year Farm Bill of the US stipulates additional payments (about 
US$5.5 billion over a 10-year period) through the Green Box (B.L. Das, 2007). 
 
2 See B.L.Das Ibid).  
 
3 More recently, there are talks of restricting imports of fresh vegetables and fruits from by air-cargo from 
developing countries under “carbon mile” rules; on the ground that air transport is the most polluting type 
of transport 
 
4 For a  survey  of issues on Private Standards and references see Henson and Reardon, Food Policy (2005), 
Vol 30, No.3 and other articles in the same issue of Food Policy.  
 
5 See also the related references herein 
 
6 Whether or not such a large difference between the two standards is a means of disguised protection  is 
debateable (See Lacovone, 2004). 
 
7  See the case of Rift Valley fever in the following pages. 
 
8 Based on Jaffee & Hensen (2004: 20, table 2). 
9 Based on Kellman and Yimer which is in turn based on SANA (South African National Standard 
Sources). 
 
10 When growers own their processing facilities, the invest cost of upgrading their facilities to meet the requirements of certificate 
bodies. In the case of Michigan blueberry industry this amounted to $100000 (Hatanaka, et. al. 2005:361). In developing countries it 
could be larger  
 
11 The donors sometimes provide technical assistance and financial help in the preparion of the food system 
of developing countries for the compliance.  
 
12 For details on probles of small hoders see OECD (2007; 16-22). 
 
13 For general problems of small holding and SMEs, see also Jaffee and Gordon (2006) and .OECD 
(2006.a). 
 
14  They include: cotton, wool, jute, sisal, tobacco, rubber wood and logs.  
 
15 . Note that the redirection of export of Sudan is partly due to exports of oil(mainly to China) and in the 
particular case of the USA to economic sanctions.  
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